Download British Naval Supremacy and Anglo-American Antagonisms, by Donald J. Lisio PDF
By Donald J. Lisio
In the course of international warfare I, British naval supremacy enabled it to impose monetary blockades and interdiction of yankee impartial transport. the us spoke back by way of development "a army moment to none," one so strong that fab Britain couldn't back effectively problem America's important monetary pursuits. This booklet unearths that after the USA provided to replacement naval equality for its rising naval supremacy, the British, still, used the ensuing significant foreign arms-control meetings of the Nineteen Twenties to make sure its persevered naval dominance.
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Additional resources for British Naval Supremacy and Anglo-American Antagonisms, 1914-1930
These bases were crucial to enable the ﬂeet to re-supply and to repair ships which would otherwise be required to return thousands of miles back to the United States. 2 The General Board’s assumptions were not politically popular. Exactly how unpopular became clear in May 1921 when President Harding and Secretary of State Hughes, with the support of congressional leaders, jettisoned the Board’s 1 2 Betty Glad, Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusion of Innocence: A Study in American Diplomacy (Urbana and London: University of Illinois Press, 1966), pp.
268, 280, 303, 324–327; Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, 2 vols. 1, 129, 115; Dexter Perkins, Charles Evans Hughes and American Democratic Leadership (Boston: Little, Brown, 1956), pp. 83–86; Robert A. Hoover, Arms Control: The Interwar Naval Limitation Agreements (Denver: University of Colorado Press, 1980), p. 23; Raymond O’Connor, Perilous Equilibrium: The United States and the London Naval Conference of 1930 (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1969) pp. 9, 13. Harold and Margaret Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918–1922 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), pp.
Secret Dispatch Sent by the British Cabinet to Mr. Balfour, Head of the British Delegation of the Washington Conference, as revealed by Mr. , QY-London and Other Conferences, Subject File 1911–1927, Box 575, Naval Records Collection, RG 45, NA. See footnote 40. “Draft Naval Memorandum with Alterations by Beatty,” May 5, 1924, in Ranft, Beatty, 2: 398–401. See also Churchill’s statement to Parliament cited in footnote 42. Chatﬁeld, Navy and Defense, p. 97. 46 This misperception would become crucial during the negotiations at the 1927 Geneva Conference.